The recently signed Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has the potential to reshape the security order of West Asia. By declaring that “any aggression against one shall be considered aggression against both”, the pact goes beyond the symbolic to institutionalize what has historically been a special relationship between Riyadh and Islamabad. For decades, Saudi Arabia has leaned on Pakistani troops for training and security, while Islamabad has relied on the Kingdom’s generous financial support, including assistance for its nuclear program. But the fact that this new agreement comes barely a week after Israel bombed Qatar shows how quickly things may change in the Gulf’s unstable security situation. This deal brings both risks and opportunities for India, which has strong commercial and diaspora ties to Saudi Arabia but is also becoming more pro-Israel.
Saudi Arabia–Pakistan Defence Ties: From History to Present
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have enjoyed a long-standing strategic partnership dating back to the early 1950s. Their golden era of military cooperation was during 1979–89, when nearly 20,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in the Kingdom. They protected not only Saudi Arabia’s land but also the holy places in Mecca and Medina. They were a barrier against invasions from Iran and Yemen. Even while everything seemed OK on the surface, there was stress in the relationship.
Saudi leaders sometimes thought of Pakistani troops as “paid guards,” while Pakistani commanders, who were used to being in charge at home, didn’t like following orders in Riyadh. Also, there was tension since people couldn’t agree on whether Shia troops should be part of the Pakistani force. The whole group was sent home by 1990, which marked the start of a more transactional period. During later crises, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and Yemen’s civil war in 2015, Pakistan turned down Saudi calls for troops, saying it would only protect the holy shrines.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif signed the revised SMDA on September 17, 2025. It aims to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries. This isn’t just a rebirth of old ties; it’s a recalibration based on how power is changing in the region.
Why the Agreement Matters Now
The timing of the SMDA cannot be overlooked. For decades, Gulf monarchies depended on U.S. security guarantees. But recent years have exposed cracks in this framework. In 2019, when Iranian-linked forces attacked Saudi oil installations, Washington did little in response. More recently, Israel’s bombing of Qatar—a U.S. ally and host of the largest American base in West Asia—reinforced doubts about U.S. reliability as a security guarantor.
At the same time, U.S. efforts to integrate Arab monarchies with Israel under the Abraham Accords have faltered. While the UAE and a few others signed up, Saudi Arabia hesitated. The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the battle that followed in Gaza made it impossible for Riyadh to officially recognize Tel Aviv. The Saudi-Pakistan deal is a clear evidence that Riyadh is making new friends and protecting itself against uncertainties in the region.
Saudi Arabia’s Calculations Behind the Pact
For Saudi Arabia, the SMDA is both symbolic and strategic. First, it sends a message to Washington and Tel Aviv that Riyadh is not overly dependent on any single partner. Second, it signals readiness to counterbalance Iran’s influence and Israel’s assertiveness in the region. Third, Pakistan’s status as the only Muslim-majority nuclear power provides a psychological reassurance to Riyadh, even if a formal “nuclear umbrella” remains uncertain.
However, there are limits. The idea of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal ever being deployed in Saudi Arabia faces stiff resistance from several nations, particularly Israel. Past incidents show just how fragile such assurances can be. For instance, during the June 2025 conflict, Pakistan was reported to have offered Iran nuclear protection—only to later withdraw that commitment. But what Saudi Arabia really wants is Pakistan’s help with training, managing equipment, and having its troops there as a show of support, not a big deployment of forces or nuclear assets.
Pakistan’s Strategic Motivations
The deal is just as much about staying alive as it is about strategy for Pakistan. Its economy remains fragile, and Saudi financial aid—whether in the form of loans, oil supplies, or investments—is a lifeline. By acting like a security provider to the Gulf, Islamabad earns respect and the ability to negotiate with Washington.
Yet, Pakistan’s expectations may not align perfectly with Riyadh’s. Islamabad has little appetite for open conflict with Iran, Yemen, or Israel at Saudi behest, just as Riyadh would hesitate to directly back Pakistan in a conflict with India or Afghanistan. For Pakistan’s military elite, the real value lies in securing new equipment, training opportunities, and personal leverage. It also expects that stronger ties with Saudi Arabia and Washington will give it a tiny edge over India in South Asia.
Implications for India
For India, the SMDA presents both challenges and choices. New Delhi has cultivated strong ties with Saudi Arabia in recent years through energetic diplomacy, bilateral defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, and promises of $100 billion in Saudi investments. India is also Saudi Arabia’s second-largest trading partner and a major buyer of crude oil. Additionally, its diaspora is the largest in the Kingdom, valued for competence and political neutrality.
But in recent battles, India has also sided with Israel, which makes its stance more complicated. As Israel becomes increasingly militant, Arab leaders seem to be becoming more cautious. It looks that Riyadh really wants to stay friends with both Pakistan and India. A high-ranking Saudi official is said to have acknowledged India’s importance as a nuclear state and a major economic partner. This suggests that Riyadh told New Delhi about the SMDA ahead of time.
This balancing act gives India some space to maneuver, but it also underlines the risks of leaning too heavily toward Israel at a time when many Arab nations are recalibrating their positions. New Delhi’s relationships with key Gulf partners could suffer if it commits too much to Israel. This would also hurt its larger strategic goals in West Asia.
In Conclusion
The Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement serves as a reminder of how quickly the security environment in West Asia may shift. At a time when uncertainty rules the region, it gives Riyadh more options as well as a perception of stability. It gets Pakistan economic and strategic benefits. But for India, it’s both a chance and a warning.
India needs to stay out of regional fights and not take sides too much. Instead, its long-term policy for West Asia should be to promote stability, protect energy interests, and keep the strategic balance between all players, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, and others. New Delhi’s future influence in the Gulf will depend on its capacity to be a stabilizing force rather than a partisan actor.